There is a utility increase of e for each agent resulting from the reallocation. 2 We are thus led to describe an allocation as pairwise optimal if for every possible pair of traders there is no reallocation of the pair's current holdings, between traders of the pair, that is weakly preferable to both traders with strict preference for at least one. Similarly, for a positive integer t, an allocation is said to be t-wise optimal if, for every group of t individuals, holdings are optimally allocated within the group. In an economy where trade takes place primarily among pairs or t-member groups of agents we expect the resulting allocation to be pairwise or t-wise optimal. It is then of interest to discover when pairwise or t-wise optimal allocations will be Pareto optimal as well.
As the example above suggests, corner solutions, the zeroes of the allocation matrix, play a pivotal role in the analysis. When traders' holdings have much in common with one another (i.e., when several positive entries coincide), the corresponding marginal rates of substitution will be equated across members of trading groups. Since the groups overlap, these MRS's will become common to all traders, hence leading to Pareto optimality. Conversely, if there is little overlap among agents' holdings the assurance of common MRS's is correspondingly weakened. Such a sparse overlap situation is likely to occur when there are many zeroes (corner solutions) in the allocation. This may lead, as in the example, to Pareto nonoptimality despite pairwise or t-wise optimality.
Conversely, sufficient overlap in traders' holdings ensures equivalence of t-wise optimality and Pareto optimality. If there is a universally held good, providing one point of overlap for all traders, then it acts like "money" to ensure the equivalence of pairwise, t-wise, and Pareto optimalities. Similarly, a single trader who holds positive amounts of all goods has complete overlap with all traders. He acts as a universal intermediary resulting again in the equivalence of pairwise, t-wise, and Pareto optimalities. The results are formalized as Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 below.
The focus on corner solutions seems appropriate inasmuch as most individuals do not consume most goods. This is particularly true when we think of commodities as differentiated by date, location, quality, and design.
We have concentrated upon restrictions on the allocation matrix A rather than on the utility functions. This is motivated by the direct observability of allocations (as compared with preferences) and forms the structure for Feldman [2] and Rader [9, 10] as well. Thus, it might be argued, statements of Pareto 2In the example above, the zeroes of the allocation matrix A are essential to the analysis. The zeroes of the marginal utility matrix P are inessential. They could be replaced by small positive numbers so that the optimality properties of the allocation are retained. optimality based on allocation and trade structure (i.e., t-wise optimality) are grounded in potentially verifiable observations. In what follows, we wish to characterize the efficiency of the economy (A, u) by that of its linear counterpart (A, u). It is rather straightforward to establish that if (A, u) is Pareto optimal then so is (A, u), since the optimality of (A, u) implies the existence of a price vector ( E R N where (A, u, () must be a competitive equilibrium. Then (A, u, t) must be a competitive equilibrium as well given the quasi-concavity and smoothness of u.
But for the Pareto optimality of (A, u) to imply optimality for (A, R) is equivalent to requiring that (A, u) can be supported by a competitive-not merely compensated-equilibrium. Sufficient conditions for the existence of such a support have been extensively investigated (see McKenzie [7] or Arrow and Hahn [1] ) and are generally stated in terms either of a minimum wealth constraint or resource relatedness and irreducibility.
Still an alternative condition deals with a weakened version of monotonicity. For a given consumption bundle if an agent's marginal utility for a good is zero, we shall suppose that reducing his consumption of that good-the remainder of the allocation held fixed-will not reduce utility. That is, a marginal utility of zero is assumed to remain zero after large finite variations in the quantity of the good. A state is represented by (A, P). The state is t-wise optimal if there is no t-wise reallocation Z constituting a t-wise improvement. The state is said to be Pareto optimal if it is M-wise optimal. We wish to investigate the relationship between pairwise, t-wise, and Pareto optimality. In particular we will establish sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for pairwise and t-wise optimality to imply Pareto optimality. The characterization of conditions that are both necessary and sufficient remains an open question. The intuition behind the symmetry argument is that efficient allocation may be considered alternatively as how a trader places his scarce purchasing power (when an efficient allocation is characterized by a market equilibrium) or how supplies of each good are allocated across traders. In the first case the allocation rule is to equate the marginal utility per dollar of expenditure across uses. In the second it is for each good to equate across traders the ratio of marginal utility of income to the marginal utility of that good. Let A' denote the transpose of A. Then we state the following theorem. THEOREM 
For a given allocation A, we are interested in the sets of preferences for which (A, P) is t-wise or Pareto optimal. Specifically, let TI'(A) = {P I (A, P) is t-wise optimal) and ll*(A) = { P (A, P) is Pareto optimal). lt(A) is

2.1: Let A be an allocation. Then WI(A) = fl*(A) if, and only if, flt(A') = H*(A').
The proof appears in the Appendix.
GENERALIZATION OF THE EARLY RADER/FELDMAN RESULTS
The above cited results by Rader and Feldman may be generalized to the case of t-wise optimality. The proof follows immediately from Lemma 4.1. Below we propose an extension of these results to the case of t-wise efficiency and with the removal of the Condition R. Heuristically, we shall propose a condition for extension such that the new individual will be supported by any price system supporting the previous allocation. Then, observing from the earlier symmetry condition that both rows and columns may be added to an economy, we shall present the appropriate generalization of 4.2. The removal of Condition R is accomplished by modifying the extension rule slightly to provide that new individuals must not desire unconsumed commodities too much. The proof is contained in the Appendix. Theorem 6.1 can be illustrated by a simple example for t = 2. If (A, P') is pairwise optimal but not Pareto optimal then the theorem assures us that there is P" so that (A, P") is pairwise but not 3-wise optimal. The following example gives us precisely this case: We have shown in Theorem 5.1 that the extension process will always create an allocation with the equivalence property. Further we will argue that a necessary condition for A to have the equivalence property is that A be an extension of the (sub)allocation consisting of A with any row or column deleted. Q.E.D.
A GENERALIZATION OF RADER'S SUFFICIENCY
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